The practice of prenatal diagnosis raises a number of serious ethical dilemmas. I sha ll focus here o n o ne of these : the selective abortion of defective fetuses. Selective abortion is commonly recognized as the ce ntral ethica l dilemma in prenata l diagnosis, and it receives new urgency in light of the recen t decisions on abortio n by the Uni ted States Supreme Court.
T he questions being raised here are first, wha t justi fications are of-fered for prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion; and second, what are the implications of the ethical reasoning embodied in these justifications? I shall argue that th e current and projected widescale practice of prenatal di agnosis and selecti ve abortion establishes precedents which both violate fundamental principles of just ice and threaten the traditiona l life-preserving orientation o f medicine .
It may be helpful first to set the entire discussion in the context of two important trends in our changing social ethos. Both these trends have achieved sharp articulation during the time of development of prenatal diagnos is, and both have influenced arguments made on behalf of prenata l diagnosis and selective abortion.
The first trend encompasses a general awareness of " women's rights" a nd specifically, a movement toward autonomy of women in the reproductive sphere. This trend received significant articulation in the Supreme Court decision in Griswold v. Connecticut ( 1966) , in which a marital right to privacy in r eproducti ve matters was decla red to be protected as a constitutional right a nd its culmination can be seen in the recent decl aration by the Supreme Court tha t " this right of privacy . . . is broad e nough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to te rminate her pregnancy." 1 C urrent concern for the effects of rapid populatio n growth and the scarcity of resources has con-110 tributed to a second trend whic influences this discussion : a move ment toward a " qua lity of life ethic which, accord ing to an ed toria l in California Medicin . places relative rather than abs< lute value on human life.2 Th " qua lity of life" ethic may be sec generally in the trend toward a• cepting abortion and specifical in arguments that it is better n< to be born than to be born U ! wa nted.
Thus prenatal diagnosis h. arisen in a general climate < concern for " popula tion growt women's rights, the consequenc of illegal abortions, the num b of 'unwanted ' children and tl discriminatory aspects of curre abortion laws.":! It · is within tl general framework and its speci, ; a rticul ation in the recent detsio ns by the Supreme Court ti' t the practice of prena tal di agno~ s a nd selective abo rtion must c assessed.
Preliminary Observations Before considering the moral y of selective abortion, some preli •-ina ry observatio ns are in ord r. Prenata l diagnosis itself is n information-gathering procedu e. C learly, the information general ·d can be used in a variety of wa s, and not only as the basis for elective abortion. Indeed, prat ,itioners stress the fact that m 1st diagnoses reveal a normal fe us and hence serve to reassure anxi1 us couples 4 and on occasion to p event a scheduled abortion.~ M ··e-over, a few disorders may be treated prenatally or postnatally on the basis of a prenatal diag noLinacre Quarterly sis, 6 and it is hoped . tha t more treatments will be a va ilable in the future.' Thus prenatal diagnosis is advocated not only to provide for selective abortions, but because it . potentially brings these other benefits as well. Nonetheless, a cursory examination reveals the centrality of se lecti ve abortion in the practice of prenatal diagnosis, and hence justifies a focus on this one issue.
To begin with, the importance of the "reassurance" rationa le can be tested by asking first, whether any woman could have an amniocentesis just to make sure that the fe tu she carries is normal, a nd second, whether a woman could get amniocentesis if she had no inte ntion of having an abortion in the event of abnorma lity. The answer to both these questions is " no ." First, not all women are considered eligible for amniocentesis, but o nl y those in " high risk" or " moderate risk" groups.K Second, even for those women in high risk groups, amniocentesis will not be perfo rmed unless abortion is at least an option,!' and some practitioners would even say that the woman mus t be committed to an abortion before diagnosis will be performed . 111 The reason in both cases is simple: the r!sks associated with the diagnostiC procedure are considered sufficiently great so as to preclude the diagnosis in the absence of genuine risk of defect a nd sufficient benefit -the benefit of reassurance alone does not outweigh the harms of the procedure.•• No matter how important the reassuring function may be May, 1973 in ac tual practice, it d oes not constitute sufficient justificati on for widescale prenatal diagnosis.
Similarl y, the a rgument that prenatal diagnosis " saves lives" by preventing abortions a lso depends on the accepta nce of selecti ve abortion : the interest here is not in saving the lives of all fetuses by preventing all a bortions, but only in saving the lives of normal fetuses by prevent ing th em from being aborted. Thus the entire line of reason ing depends on acceptance of the aborti on of defecti ve fetuses.
As for treatment, there are currently only a few disorders for which treatments are avail able and "at the present time, the emphasis is placed on diagnosis of disorders in wh ich there is no treatment."l 2 Moreover, even where treatment is available, most practitioners still allow the couple the choice of abortion, and indeed suggest that that is what most parents would prefer. 1 : 3 Hence the avai lability of treatment does not rule out a bortion .
Developing Treatments But even though treatment is not a major possibility now, sure ly prenatal diagnosis might be j ustified as a necessary means to gain basic informa tion needed in order to stimula te the development of new treatments . 14 Attracti ve though this argument might at first seem, however, there are several problems here.
First, if parents would indeed choose a bortion over "any but the most trivia l treatmen t, " •~ it is not clear th at th e impetus to deve lop treatments will exist.
(But even if future fetuses might indeed benefit from information gained through present diagnoses, there re ma ins a serious question : is it justifiable to subject a fetus to risk in an e xperiment which carries no hope of benefit to that fetus but only to future fetuses? The lack of clear legal a nd ethical guidelines regarding experimentation on the unbo rn must not o bscure the fact tha t this is a critical questio n. Should the fetus be protected, fo r example, by laws that govern experimentation on mino rs? The answer to this question is beyond the scope of this essay ; but the question must be recogni zed.)
Seco nd, whatever ho pe there may be for future treatments, such future possibilities do not in fact form sufficient justification for the performance of prenatal diagnosis in the eyes of some practitioners. Dancis states that any attempt previously to diagnose defects prior to birth would have met with th e response "why bother?" because no inter vention was possible. ' " It is " medical inter ventio n of some sort" that justifies the use o f prenatal diagnosis. And, as . we have seen, intervention " of some sort" usuall y means aborti on.
It is obvious, then, that whatever other benefits may be clai med fo r prenata l diagnosis, for the present and for the foreseeable future, its "justifying" or " real" purpose is to provide fo r selective abortio n . Ethically, then, the crux of the matter is whether or not selective abortion of defective fetuses is justifiable.
11 2 II Selective abo rtio n is not, o l course, a new issue. While it ha~ rarely been a central issue in the "abo rtion debate ," it has received at least sporadic attention follow ing rubella epidemics and tht tha lidomide scare. A "eugenit abortion" clause has appeared i1 almost every pro posed model cod, for abortion reform, and a nu m ber o f states have included sucl a c lause in revised abortio n statute within the last few years.t7 Hence the issue itself is not new.
What is new in selective ab01 tion following prenatal diagnos1 is the certa inty of the diagnos i• Previously, a decision for selecti \ o r " eugenic" abortio n had to c based o n statistical probability < " risk" figures; now, an "actu diagnosis" can be made.' K Tht . prenatal diagnosis is hailed as great advance fo r " taking the. gar ble o ut" o f pregnancy and gene t ; counselingYJ
The advent o f pren atal diagnm ~ the refore focuses the question selective abortio n in a new at J dra matic way : for the first ti n the problem of selective aborti n arises no t bec ause of accident •r mis hap, but because of the del! •-er ate intervention of medical te< 1-no logy. For the fi rst time, select e aborti on is not an occasio nal a td regrettable act, but the plan r ·d outcome of delibe rate progra ol S of medical practice.
Nonetheless, most of the ethi al issues ra ised by prenatal diagno, is and se lecti ve abortion are issues tha t have been implici t o r expltc it in the "abortio n debate" over the i\l ay. 1973 past few years. Now th is debate has raged so long and hard and covered so much territo ry that one is well advised to exercise caution when e ntering fhe fray. Moreover, the recent decisions by the Supreme Court suggest that the wisest course might be to assume that the legal resolution of the issue also resolves the moral dilemmas.
Arguments Examined However, I suggest that previous debate and present legal fr amework notwithstanding, there may yet be a little room fo r clarificatio n of the issues and mo ra l decision-making with regard to selective abortion . Therefore, I s hall exa mine the a rguments offered as j ustification for selecti ve aborti on and place those arguments within a logical framework which will he lp to asce rtain what is rea ll y at stake in this practice.
The m atter is co mplicated at th e outset by the fact that few practitioners present explicit a rguments to justify selective abortio n. Most advocates si mply refer to the legality of abortion or its acceptance within a significant reference group -:-for example, " therapeutic aborti on may be offered where it is legal," 20 "most people would probably prefer a bo rtion," 2 t " most obstetricians would regard abortion as acceptable," 22 and so o n. Indeed, some practitio ners specifica lly e~~mpt themselves from responsib_ thty for maki ng the ethical deciSio n, on grounds th at it is their j?b to lay the e mpirica l foundations on which legal, ethica l, and politica l decisions wi ll be made by others. ~:1 l\lay, 1973 o netheless, alongside specific disclaimers and vague re fere nces to decision-making groups there emerges fro m the discussio n a constellatio n of claims for selective abortio n.
First, selecti ve abortio n is justified o n grounds that it procures benefits fo r individual famili es : it protects them from the financia l and e motio na l strains associated with bearing and rearing a c hild with a genetic disease 24 and it minimizes the risks involved in pregna ncy. Special pleas a re made o n behalf of families with a previous history of devastating defect, who may be afraid to " take a chance" with another pregna ncy unless they can have prenata l diagnosis.t.> In addition, there is consider able emph as is o n the rights of wo men and couples and especia lly on freedo m of choice and auto no my in the reproductive s phere . Amniocentesis is seen as a technique which " o pens doors"-that is, which expands the o ptio ns available to women and the ir spouses, thus enabl ing them to exercise freedom of choice. 21 ; It is a cardinal rule in the practice of prenata l diagnosis that the " ultimate" decisio n fo r both di agnosis a nd aborti o n is to be made by the coupleP O ne practitioner has even suggested that parents have a righ t to healthy children.tK First Rationale T hus the fi rst r atio na le given for selecti ve a bo rtio n . is that of the benefits accruing to indi vidual women and their fam ilies. As this ratio na le begins to shade over into .. , ,, qu estions of women's rights and reproductive freedom, it t a kes o n the c ha racte r of the first social trend e nume ra ted above, ass imilating the trend a nd contributing to it.
Alo ngside th is concern for the pregnant woma n a nd he r fa mily, the re e m e rges a nother concern : an inte rest in the impact of genetic disease o n society as a whole, and in the public health as pects of prenatal diagnosis. Justification for diagnosis and a bortio n is therefore a lso derived from benefits to society gained through wide -scale screening programs.
In the first place, genetic ists contend tha t screening progra m s co uld have a e uge nic effect in e liminating d e lete rio us genes fro m the gene poo 1.<!9 In the second place, practitio ne rs argue that screening and a bortio n would significantl y reduce fin a ncial burde ns to the sta te, since fewer childre n would be born needing costly medical o r institutio n a l care. Elabo rate costbenefit economic analyses have been m a d e for several disorde rs .:ICI Conce rn fo r protection of society a t la rge is thus the second reason give n as justifica tio n for selective a borti o n .
Just as a rguments rega rding bene fits to women "shad ed over" into a rguments a b out women's ri gh ts and procreative f reedom, so he re the a rgu ments regardin g be nefits to soc iet y shade over in to a la rge r conce rn, which may be e ncom p assed by the phrase " quality o f life ." Prenatal di agnosis a nd se lective abortion a re justified because they function to preserve a 114 norm of genetic health which a pa rt of the " quality of li fe.":i t
The concern for a standard o ge ne t ic health may be seen to op era te, first, in the assumptio n tha pre na ta l diagnos is and selectiv ab o rti on function as " preventi v medicine." This assumption ha been made explicit on several oc casio ns .: 12 Moreover, it is implic in the u se of phrases such as " r( duce the incide nce of disease, "elimina te di sease," or " prever the birth o f " rather than '.'abort As " preventive medicine," prenat. di agnos is a nd selecti ve ab ortio combine to preserve the no rm < genetic health which is a pa rt < the qua lity of life .
Second, concern. · fo r the nor of genetic health and the qua li of life have been r a ised expli ci t by sever al advocates. Qua lity · r" life questio ns a re m ost often link( I to questions of quantity, and it ~ here th a t the conce rn for ge ne t no rma lcy becomes most apparer Prenata l diagnos is is seen as means o f quality control in J qua ntity-l imited syste m . O n t c level of the indi vidua l family, t e qu a ntity-qua lity link is seen cle < ·-ly in sta te ments to the effect t l 1t w ith increasing pressure to li n it fa mily size, pa rents will not W <.J 1t to risk a ny d eparture from the l1l rmal in the ir offspring.:r:r lnded, unde r pressures of quantity, q u 1-ity contro l becomes a right : · if the s ize of our fa milies must JC limited , surely we a re e ntitled to children who a r e healthy rat her th a n defective. " : 14
Social Needs The qua lity pro blem is seen not only o n the individua l level, however, but a lso as a res ponse to societal needs. Thus one practitio ne r . claims: " The world no lo nger needs all the individuals we a re capa ble of bringing into it," a nd a rgues for selective abortion on these grounds. 3s Prenatal di agnosis becomes a tool to e n sure th a t "both the quantity and quality of the human race a re kept within reasonable limits.":l 6 Maintaining the norm of genetic health thus justifies prenata l diagnosis a nd selective a bortion because m a intenance of the no rm is a necessary step in ensuring quality of life in a time of concern for populatio n growth. The concern he re is well su mmarized by one practitio n e r re flecting on the work of severa l pio neers in the fi~ld:
Dr. Gerbie a nd his. assoc iates have helped us take still a no the r step down the long road wh ich we must foll ow if we are going to improve the q uality of h u man existence while searching f o r better methods of controlling populatio n densit y.:l1
Finally, the norm of g~netic health may a lso be seen in the argument that the fetus h as a right to be "well-born. ":lH The argument here is that there is a fundamenta l right to be born " with no rmal body and mind" and th at if this right is no t to b e fulfill ed , then it is better not to be born a t a11.:19
. In sum, the impo rtance of gene t-IC health is ta ken as a given, which carries its own justifica tio n . It is ~nly necessary to know th a t there IS a choice betwee n he alth a nd disease: _ the obvious choice on the part of a ll parties-fa mily, society, May, 1973 a nd the indi vidual concernedwill be for health .40 These, then , a re the j u stifications for selective aborti on: benefits to the woman a nd fam ily a nd to society as a who le, b o th in terms of sp ecific a nd measurable emotional a nd economic facto rs a nd in terms of the mainte nance or restoratio n o f the norm of genetic health.
Ill
We can now ask how th ese justificat io ns fit into the context of the "abortio n deba te," what other assumptions are necessary to explicate the m, a nd what it means to fo llow out the ir implicatio ns logica ll y.
Severa l of the justifications offered for selective abortio n followin g pre natal di ag nosis a re simila r to specific a rgument s u sed to esta blish other ca te go ri es of " indic a tio ns for abortio n. "
The concern to prot ect the woma n a nd fam ily e m o tiona lly a nd fina nc ia lly is not a n ew concern in the a borti o n d e bate, nor is it unique to se lective (or euge ni c) a bo rtio n; rather, it is re miniscent o f the " psychiatric" and "socioecono mic" indications for aborti o n . Thus if these a rguments a re u sed to justify se lective abort io n, the justi fica tio n becomes simila r to tha t u sed for the p sychiatric a nd socio-economi c indications. And indeed, it appears to b e the practice in some places to requi re a psychia tric examinatio n and justify the abortion as " therapeutic" o n these grounds. 4 ' However, some a d vocates rej ect the " psychiatric indications" a rgument: one practitioner calls it " circuitous" and " ridiculous" to require psychiatric examination of the woman following diagnosis of defect in the fetus. 42 They want the presence of defect alone to be sufficient justification for aborti on. This argument, therefor e, parallels the traditiona l a rguments for a separate category of " eugenic" abortion which has validity independently of other criteria.
The assertion that there should be an independent category of abo rtio n for "eugenic" indica ti ons, in which the very presence of defect j ustifies abortion, is a logical outcome of reasoning o n the basis of a no rm of genetic health. Thus a psychiatrist commenting o n prenatal di agnosis notes that " for some people, abortio n of a defecti ve fetus is less unsavory than abortion of a presumably no rmal fetus," and he explains this fact on the basis that it is " in line with our medical orientation that makes the extirpation of disease a no ble act."~:l
If arguments for selective abortion appear at first glance to coincide with va rio us arguments for " ind ications" for abortio n, however, there is also evide nce of affinities between arguments used for selective abortion and the soca lled " abo rtio n on demand" a rguments.44 Here, the basic cla im is that the woman's freed o m is an overriding value which dictates the availability of abortio n " witho ut reason" (that is, without public o r legislative consensus o n the reason proffered) . Women may thus choose to have a c hild or 116 not, to have a defective child not, as they please.
C learly, then, it is necessary examine the arguments for sell ti ve abortio n both within the ge eral conte xt of "abortion on c · mand" a nd within the mo re s peci ~ context of specia l claims made the case of defect. It will also ~ necessary to suggest ways in whi '1 the recent Supreme Court d ecis i :1 impinges on the various argume. s and sets the context for any futt e actio n . IV I shall begin by examining Vt y briefly the question of " abort i n on demand ." (Before do ing ), however , a brief note is necess: ·y regarding the relation of abort: n on d e mand to the mo re speciali, ·d arguments for abortion in selec ·d categories. The histo ry of the ab r· tio n controversy makes it o bvi < JS th at it is possible to argue for elected categori es of justifiable ab •r· tio n without a lso condoning ab r· tio n o n demand . I would ar, Je that it is also logically possi blc to condone abortion on demand w hou t necessarily condoning eugc tic abortion . Logically, o ne can ar uc that a wom an has the right to le· termine whether or not she is 1 re· pared to acce pt a pregna ncy, mt th at ha ving m ade that determr 1a· tio n the particular status of ,he fetus sho uld be irrelevant.)
T he a b ortio n on demand ar gu· ment gives primacy to the freecom of choice of the woman. Howe ' er, it must a lso deal with the fact , hat freedom of choice of one hu man being does no t usuall y extend to the po int of killing another hu nwn Linacre Quar lc rly being; that is, there is · a presumption that a human being has a right to life and that my freedom does not normall y extend to the point where it de prives ano ther of his right to li fe . Thus if the fetus is considered to be a human being, the woman would not no rmally have the right to kill that human being. T o counter this difficulty, advocates of abortion on demand usually take either of two positions: First, they argue that the fetus is not a human being -or not " fully" humanand hence has no right to li fe. Second, they a rgu e that altho ugh the fetus is human a nd hence has a right to life, there is something in the unique relationship of the WQman and fetus that destroys the "normal" prohibition against ki lling.
Most advocates have taken the first approach: they assert that the fetus is not (fully) huma n. A rguments of this sort range from those that assert that the fetus is a me re "tissue" or part of the woma n's body 45 to those that recogni ze the fetus as a " develo ping" o r "potential" human being, but argue that full humanity is not present until a specified time.
Must Set Time
The difficulty with this view is that advocates must then determine a time at which the developing embryo/fetus/neonate is considered to be (fully) human -six weeks? three mo nths? at viability? one year after birth ? That is, they are caught in a line-drawing pro blem: Wh en does the individual acquire full human sta tus? The desigMay, 197 3 nation of a time of attainment of full humanity a lways presupposes the c ho ice of criteria accord ing to which huma nity is determinedbrain function ? lung capacity? personality? speech?
Now these criteria for deter mining that one has reached full humanity always have to do with functional capacity and personal develo pment. Hence it is always possi ble to ask whe ther there would be others besides fetuses who would, logica ll y speak ing, be subject to the determination that they are not " full y human" and hence not protectab le under the law.
For example, geneticist J oshua Leder berg argues that the moment of conceptio n should not be conside red " as the start of human life"; rather, he sugges ts, " an operationa lly useful po int of divergence o f the developing organism would be a t approxima tely the first year of life, " ·W on the basis of develo pment of la nguage and cogniti ve interacti on with others. However, the establishment of this time point on these criteria would obviously allow for the destructio n of the newborn c hild up to one year of age . Logically speak ing, Lederberg's criteri a would allow for infa nticide. At this poi nt, Lederberg draws back from accepting the logical conclusions of his sta ndards and refuses to discuss infanticide, on g rounds that our emo tio na l in volvement with infa nts is sufficient to establi sh "a prag ma tica ll y useful dividing line." He then implies that the " tastes" o r emoti o na l involvement of " the majority" determines o ne's status as a human being to be given full protection under the law: " To discuss the fetus du ring prenata l life as if he we re a human be ing is · merely to reflect the emotional invo lvement of that observer, according to a set of tastes no t no w shared by the majority." One must ask, then, whether persons o r groups who do not meet the standard of emotional involve men t would be considered less tha n fully human and no t protectable -for example, the convicted criminal o r any outcast group: 17 Once again, Lederberg draws back from the logical conclusions of his own argument and suggests that the criterion of emo tional involvement "sho uld not be co nfused with a ny objective biological standard by which we can set up principles of socia l o rder." Lederberg's search for an " o bjecti ve biological s tandard" to get him o ut of the pro blems he e ncounters with his own criteria illustrates as well as anything the inherent difficulty in this basic line of approach : any biological point that is chosen \':ill be chosen o n the basis of other crite ria, and these c riteria . are a ll too o ften the results of our very huma n weaknesses. (Do we choose uspo ntaneous lung functi on" as the dete rmining criteri on of humanness because we really think it is a decis ive criterion, or rather because we would like to be able to destroy the fetus prior to viability?) Are we willing to accept the conseque nces of our · choices -what about those who must exist with the help of an iron lung?
8
Human Standards In sho rt, there is no "objecti biologica l standard," but o nly ve ' rea l human standards. To be su som e choices make more ser than o thers: Fletcher has suggest~ for exa mple, that in order to ~ consiste nt with ou r increasing entation toward bra in activity defining the end of human li we sho uld also define the beg ning of human life in terms ,f bra in activi ty. 4 8 Certa inly, ·· c< ~~ sistency is a desirable trait in b< h logical thinking and huml\n in t action ; indeed, this suggest n f!1akes considerable sense. Hl :-ever, s ince the presence of br n activity in the fet us has been m 1-sured as earl y as six weeks, c· 1-siderably before a mniocentes is ' ,n be performed, F letc her 's criter m wo uld preclude prenata l diagn1 is and selective abortio n.
In view of the difficulties J f drawing a line on the devcl pmental continuum, several ad acates of aborti o n o n demand h ve preferred to take the second ro ,e: they argue for abortion o n he basis of the special relatiom tip betwee n the woman a nd the f us which is deemed to nu lli fy .he prohibition against killing. he most intriguing expos ition of an a rgument alo ng thi s line is t ha of Judith J arvis Thomson. 4 ! 1 Tho mson proposes that we accept, fo r the sake of argun ; nt, the claim that the fetus is hum<••l.:,u T he question then is, under ' hat circumstances may we justi fLtbly kill a human being? Suppose, -,ays Thomson, that you wake one m Jrning strapped to a famous un..:onscious violinist who needs your Li nacre Q uart.:rl Y kidneys to survive; " Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation? Does the right to . life of the violinist require this heroic a n<;! self-sacrificing act on the part of another person? T homson concludes that · it does not: " nobody is morally required to make large sacrifices, o f health, of all other interests and concerns, of all o ther duties and co mmitments, for nine years, o r even for nine mo nths, in order to keep another person a li ve." In essence, T homson's argument rests upon the mora l right of the woman to remove herself from the violinist -or from the fetus. While separating woman and fetus in fa.ct secures the death of the fetus, Thomson is not arguing that a woman has a right to secure the death of the fetus, but only to remove herself. Presuma bl y, if pre-natal adoption o r an artificial womb were available, e ither of the options could be used to preserve the fetus while freeing the woman.
This a rgument is more than intriguing; it has a certa in force in its logic. Nonetheless, I think it also admits of some difficulties. Thomson clai ms th a t th e woman has a right to remove herself fro m the fetus; the fact that the fe tus then dies is perhaps unfortunate, but not central to the mo ra l issue. Perhaps a different scena rio wi ll help elucidate the issues.
If one gr ants, as T ho mson does th ' . at the fetus is human, then the ~ssue is whether o ne human beIng may remove herself from another when that other is depend- May, 1973 ent upon her body functions for survival. Surely the closest parallel to pregnancy, then, is the case of s ia mese twins, in wh ich separatio n would cause the death of one twin. The mo ral question then is : could an adult siamese twin choose to " remove" herself from her twin, knowing full well that the twin would die, but claiming that her freedom was the more important value? (The medical practice of involuntar ily se parating siamese twins at birth, with the resultant death of one, does no t change the moral argument regarding the righ ts of adult siamese twins.) If anything, it could be argued that we sho uld fee l more sympathy toward the plig ht of the siamese twin than toward the pregnant woman -the twin's predicamen t is both involunta ry and lifelong. Yet I wonder if we would be wi lling to accept the twin's argument; would we not be inclined to consider the " removal" of one adult twin with the resultant death o f the other to be mu rder, or wrongful killing? It is not clear to me that we are read y to argue logically that o ne human being may "remove" himself from a nother when that r emoval causes the other's death.
Other Examples Indeed, to bring the scenario a little "closer to home" for most of us, let us suppose that a man is responsible fo r the continued care o f his e lde rly a nd dependent father, who will die if no one is in attendance at his bedside. Surely this man is m o rally free to leave his father 's bed s ide i.f there is • . someone else t o sit and watch over his father. But w hat if there is no one else? Is he then morally free to walk off, leaving his father to die? O r, suppose a young child needs medication every few hours to survive; is not that child's mother mo ra lly (and perha ps legally) culpable if she " removes" herself from the child and it dies?
In short, Tho mso n's distinctio n between removing o neself fro m a no ther and securing the death of ano ther becomes problematic when we consider a variety of cases. In cases where our nurturing functi o n could be served by others, we are perhaps willing to argue that we have a right to re move ourselves provided that we have secured someone else to carry on the nurturing. But in cases where there is no o ne else to carry o n tha t function -i.e., in pregnancy today, and in the case of sia mese twins -I suggest that a view that reall y respects the full humanity of the other wi ll not so readily a llow us to argue tha t we may " re move ourselves," causing thereby the death of the othe r. ( Hence, I suspect that Tho mson .has no t reall y ta ken the human status of the fetus serious ly, that she has not really overcome her ow n predisposi ti on " that the fetus is no t a person fro m the moment of conceptio n.")
To accept Tho mson's argument mea ns to accept what it logicall y enta ils: the right of any human being to remove himself fro m one who is dependent o n him, even if that removal results in the o ther's d eath -the elde rl y father , th e 120 child in need of medicatio n, an the adult siamese . twin. Once agai1 the argument allows for the de structio n of othe r human being• If we are not willing to acceJ these consequences, the n we mu· reject the premises. v Thus far, I have dealt with tl general question of abortion u1 der the rubric "abortion o n de mand," locating two basic wa. of approaching this issue and su gesting that there are probl~ms the extens io n of logic in either these approaches. It has not be• 1 my intentio n to resolve the iss of w hether or no t the fetus is c titled to protection of its li fe, t only to illustrate the difficul ll ' encountered in a position that c nies protection to the fetus.
However , the questi o n of seh tive a bortio n introduces a new c ment to the discussion . As Dan ·I Calla han suggests, with select 1 e abo rtion we are dealing not w h the proble m of an unwanted p n ?-nancy, but with the problem of n unwa nted ch ild:'' A logical e x rcise will illustrate what is at sta c: Suppose that an art ificial wo tb were avai I able. Then , if the p rpose of abortion is to free 1e wo man from an unwanted pr gnancy, logically the fetus would be placed in the artificial womb. Wo dd a defective fetus also be thus r ·e-se rved, o r would its ge ne tic st<..tUS somehow " make a diffe rence" in how it is treated?
Since the purpose of seleCti ve abortio n is no t only to pro tect the wo ma n but also to protect soc1dY and preser ve the 11o rm of ge ndic Linac re Quartc:riY health, it seems logical to assume that simply moving the fetus from one location to another wou ld no t ·be sufficient to fulfi ll the purposes of selective a bortion. To the extent that selective abortion is o ri~ ented toward ma intenance of the norm of genetic health or the "quality of life," it requires the destruction of those who do not meet this norm. Now this illustration of the artificial womb is, of course, a hypothetical situatio n a t ·present. Nonetheless, there are indicati o ns in the current practice that demonstrate the centrality of destructio n of defective fetuses in this practice.
Determining Sex
First, prenatal diagnosis is used to determine the sex of the fetus in cases at risk for sex-linked disorders such as hemophilia. In such cases, the male fe tus which is aborted has a 50 percent ch ance of being normal. Thus half of the fetuses which are aborted in sexlinked cases will in fact be no rma l; this destruction of norma l fetuses is allowed in order to e nsure destructio n of defecti ve fetuses . Now in the case of sex-linked disorders, one does no t know whether a particular fe tus is de fecti ve o r normal ; hence the abortio n is d one on the supposition that the fetus might be defective. A more complicated case, therefore, would be that of a diagnosis of twins wh ich revealed o ne normal twin and o ne defective twin. In such a case, in order to " get rid of" the defecti ve fetus, it would be necessary to destroy . the normal fetus as well. Would this destruction of no rma l ~lay, 1973 fetuses be allowed? To date, prenatal diagnosis has missed the presence of twins, but practitio ners agree that parents would be allowed the choice. 52 Thus even a known normal fe tus could be aborted in o rder to abort an abno rma l fe tus.
Fina lly, since there is a lways a possibility of error in diagnosis, we can ask whether advocates prefer a false positive which would result in the abortion of a norma l fe tus, or a false negative which wou ld result in the birth of a n affected child. Practitioners disagree here. One states flatl y tha t the loss of the "rare norma l pregnancy" would be "an undefendable catastro phe." 53 Another, however, suggests that it is a " mo re critica l" error if a negative diagnosis is given and the ch ild is born defecti ve than if a positive diagnosis results in abortion of a presumed defective fet us and the defect is no t confirmed upo n examination of the abortus. 5 -t It seems clear that the practice of prenatal diagnosis establishes a distinction between the no rmal and the defective fetus, and allows for differential treatment of the fe tus o n th is basis. As one concerned practitioner put it: "We are faced with problems of assigning va lues to individuals with given genetic characteristics and designing programs directed against them."~.;
Serious Problems
What a re the implications o f ado pting this kind of reasoning -of treating fetu ses diffe rentia lly acco rding to their gene tic con-stitution? I suggest that there are a number of serious problems in establishing this kind of precedent, and I shall deal briefly with several of these, illustrating where appropriate with difficulties encountered already in the practice of prenata l diagnosis. 5 6
The first problem is th at of determining the categories of fetuses considered destructible. Where is the line to be drawn on the determination of what constitutes sufficient " qua lity of life" to ena ble the fetus to live?
This problem will be encountered in two forms. In the first form, it has to do with the severity of genetic defect. The normative use of prenatal diagnosis is for severe, untreatable disorders (e.g., Tay-Sachs, Down's syndrome). However, even present techniques will diagnose less severe disorders (e.g., XO), and with expanding technology such incidents may be anticipated more frequently. Will abortion be allowed fo r less severe genetic disorders, or for disorders where treatment is available?
Already this problem is being encountered in · the practice of prenatal diagnosis, a nd advocates appear to be divided in their responses. While some would maintain that " if there is an effective intrauterine treatment, then, of course, it should be applied," 57 probably most would agree that abortion in the case of a treata ble disorder " remains a parental decision based on the informed counse l of their physicia n. " 5 K Second, the determina tion of 122 destructible fetuses may be e tended from clear genetic cat gories to categories of social d sirability or usefulness. As Ka says, "Once the principle, ' Defe tives should not be born,' is e tablished, grounds other than cyt logical and biochemical may ve well be sought."5 9 The beginnin of this trend may already be se 1 in the treatment of fetuses wi 1 XYY chromosomes, where· t " prognosis" for the child is pr Iematic primarily because-of t possibility of socia lly undesiral behavior. If XYY fetuses are be aborted, then what about fetw s of women living in undesirab le c cumsta nces -for example, wo en on welfare? Will "quality ~f life" come to be d etermined m< e on the basis of socia l useful n s than clear genetic disorder? C e practitiOner has a lready ~rgt d for prenatal diagnosis on groUJ Is that " the world no longer ne• Is a ll the individuals we a re capa le of bringing into it -especi : ly those who are unable to camp te and a n unhappy burden to < hers."60 Surely such criteria as "ability to compete" extend ' 1e range of destructible fetuses ar beyond the severe ly genetic lly handica pped . Indeed, I would stress the tct tha t all categories chosen dep nd on some social criteria -e en those that are most closely 11ed to genetic anomaly. For exam .1le, most practitioners consider Dov n's syndrome to be a " clear-cut" case calling for abortio n.H 1 Certa111 ly the genetic compo ne nt -a trisomy G -is clear enough ; and this genetic component is re lated to certain clinical symptoms such as mental retardation. But to determine therefore that fetuses with trisomy G . should be aborted is to make a social judgment about the place of retarded individuals in society. It is possible to judge disability or deviation from a norm medically, but to determine that this deviation constitutes a significant handicap is to make a socia l judgment. H2
Drawing a Line The first point, then, is th at it is extremely difficult to "draw a line" · with regard to the categories of fetuses which will be considered destructible, since all determination of such categories includes a social compone nt a nd will be subject to the vagaries of ~oci al opinion. The phrase "qualIty of life" defines a continuum from the severely disabled through the socially undesirable to the "optimal" child. Where on this continuum will the line be drawn?
The second " line drawing" problem has to do with the time continuum. As one practitioner asks: " Are we going to be faced with d~mands to do away with a child With 2 1-trisomy whose mother was only 34 years old during her pregnancy and therefore was denied t~e benefits of prenatal di agnos ?1"3 IS. I Do not the same arguments that j ustify abortion of a fi ve month old fetus a lso justify infanticide?
That this question is not J·ust r ·f anc•. ~I is borne out by a recently pubh~Ized case at Johns Hopkins Hospita l in which a newborn c hild with Down's syndrome was re port- May, 1973 edly starved to death because its parents refused surgery necessary to save its life.H 4 It seemed clear tha t had the child been normal, the surgery would have been pe rformed. Indeed, some physicians now argue explicitly for a different standard of treatment for newborn children with Down's syndrome. One has said : " Parents of mongoloids have the legal (and I believe the moral) responsibility of determining if their child . should live or die, " and he suggests that this decision may be seen as a "second chance" for abortion. 1 ;5
Thus it seems th at infanticide is si mply the logical extension of prenatal diagnosis. Indeed, one practitiOner comments: "Early abortion based on prenatal diagnosis can be viewed as the modern counterpa rt o f infanticide based on congenita l defect. "H6 This, then, is the second serious problem implicit in the reasoning behind prenatal diagnosis a nd selecti ve abortion.
These firs t two pro blems have been line-drawing problemsproblems of determining the categories of destructible fetuses, and the time of destructi on. The third problem is of a somewhat different nature. It involves the locus of decision -making and the possible conflict between ''women's rights" on the one hand and the "quality of li fe" on the other. I suggest that as increasing value is assigned to the " preventi ve" fun ction of prenatal diagnosis a nd selective abortion, the concern to eliminate de-fectives and preserve the " quality of life" may logicall y be extended to deprive women and families of decision-maki ng power.
Quality of Life
To be sure, at present advocates assume that the concept of "quality of life" embraces both the familial a nd the social aspects of prenatal diagnosis, and that there will be a concurrence of benefits to individua ls and to society. They assume that if women are given freedom of choice, they will choose to abo rt defective fetuses and hence their choices will serve th e best interests of society as well.
However, it is obvious that the interests of individual families and of society at large will not always coincide -even in the decision to abort the defective fetus. For example, it has been calculated that if all male fetuses at risk for hemophilia we re aborted and " replaced " by female children, the result would be a dramatic increase in the number of female carriers of hemophi lia -a 50 percent increase in the gene frequency in each generationY 7 Hence, decisio ns made to benefit individual fa milies ·might have a dysgenic effect o n society as a whole.
On the o th er hand, at times where it would be beneficial financially to society for a fetus to be aborted , the woman o r family might prefer not to abort. Would the woman's freedo m of choice be restricted . here o n gro unds of benefiting society o r preserving the genetic health? One concerned practitione r has raised the problem by suggesting that the unce r-124 tainties could result in an acc entuation of the conflict in our society between personal c hoice and governmental control, which could possibl y come in the form of selected programs of compulsory screening and mandato ry abortion fo r some conditions that are deemed socially lntolerable.68
Indeed, co mpulsory abortion has ready been proposed. t>9 In a situatio n where the . fe s has no inherent rights and gene c health becomes an overriding ' 1-ue , compulsory amniocentesis < d abortion is a logical outcome, ts one practitioner rightly antici pa s:
The decision to terminate the li f of a fetus has traditionally bee denied even to the couple at r i s~ but the more widespread legal at ceptance of aboriio n, the grow in awareness of the impending cris inherent in the populatio n expl ( sion, a nd increased concern for tt social cost of genetic disease lea me to think that atte mpts to ·legi late eugenic progra ms may not 1 so untimel y or even so far in tl future as many of us have expecte Individua ls in a society which willing to allow eve n normal fetu s • to be aborted simply at the requ( t of the parents are not likely to : very to lerant of a know n abnorrr I fetus.' 0 To be sure, sever al practitic tcrs ha ve expressed their alarm an. rejection of compulsory prog ams a t the same time as they rais th e questio n. But the point is th a the movement toward compu sory aborti o n of defecti ve fetuses is a logical outcome of . e levating the no rm of ge netic health to ewerride any rig hts of the fetus.
Further, once a principle ha!> been establis hed that the genetically unequal may be treated unequall y in Linacrc Quarterly accordance with the ir genetic potential, other forms of unequal treatment will be enco mpassed by this principle. One of the first a reas to be affected by the application of this principle will be that of procreation: the suggestion has already been made that reproduction be regulated in accordance with genetic inheritance -that " qu ality control" have a built-in "qua lity control" component. 71 A practitioner has even claimed that " most of the women screened should not have been pregna nt in the first place. All women who would have genetically high-risk pregnancies should be offered steriliza tion o r an effective method of contraception.72 Thus the way is opened up. for other kinds of restrictive programs as we ll.
Impact on Medicine
Finally, the acceptance of selective abortion and its principle of unequal treatment of unequa ls will have profound implications for the practice of med icine . On the o ne hand, if selective abortion is a woman's right, then the physician is obligated to provide for it _73 As with "abortion on demand," the role of the physicia n is thus radically changed: " For the first time · · · doctors will be expected to do _ an operation simply because the patient asks that it be done. "74 The physician, then, becomes a technici_ an performing according to the destres of others.
_There is evidence alread y that this dilemma is being encountered in the practice of prenatal diagno- May, 1973 sis, a nd tha t ma ny practitioners are relucta nt to give up entirely their traditio nal decisio n-making functio n. Thus, for example, one suggests that a mniocentesis should not be do ne in cases of LSD ingestion because the physician would be obligated to provide fo r an abo rtio n if chromosome breaks are found ; 75 here, the physician retains his power of making a medical judgment. Another practitio ner has suggested that the use o f prenatal diagnosis simply to de termine the sex of the fetus constitutes an " abuse" of prenata l diagnosis a nd that information o n the sex of the fetus should be withheld " unless it is crucial for management of the case." 76 Prenatal diagnosis, in this view, is not to be a tool fo r the "frivolo us" uses of women ; ye t if abortion is a woman's r ight, then it must be performed no matter how "coldblooded and contrived" it seems to the phys ician.
On the other hand, if selective abortion is justified no t as a woma n's right but as a means of ma intaining the norm of genetic health and pro moting "quality of life," the physician is in danger of becoming a technician for society. Theologian Helmut Thielicke decla res that the doctor becomes a n "engineer, a technici an doing manipulations for a productive society . " 77 Thus Friedmann suggests that " it is not difficult to imagine the emergence of pressures to set sta ndards for desirability in genetica ll y determined huma n characteristics" and we must ask whose sta nda rds they might be. 71! Thus in the long run, this practice threatens the basic orie ntation of medicine: as geneticist Jerome Lejeune puts it, to "capitulate in the face of our ignorance and propose to eliminate those we cannot help" is to reverse the entire course of medicine. Not only do the principles established here have serious imp lications for human rights in society, but they also challenge the foundations of medical practice. VI Now clearly, many of these same problems have arisen in the general debate on abortion, and are not unique to selective abortion. In a sense, one could say that selective abortion gives a prismatic view of the implications of abortio n in general -of the problems of extension of logic, the threats to human rights and to medical practice. Both a bortion in general a nd selective abortion in particula r involve the assignment of relative rather than absoiute value to human life on the basis of some social criteria; hence both establish precedents which violate fundamental princip.les of justice as we have understood those principles .in Western society.
Nonetheless, if the basic logic of selective abortion does not differ from that of abortion in general, it is focused and reinforced here in a way which makes its implications more striking and perhaps more threaten ing. As Kass suggests, precisely because the quality of the fetus is at stake in the decision for selective abortion, this decision undermines the fundamental moral equality of all human beings.7 9
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Further, the practice of prena d diagnosis adds something to t 1S equatio n: the deliberate institut n of medical programs designed o fos ter selective treatment of hu n n li fe. Friedmann captures the tr h well in his haunting statement t 1t
Prenatal genetic diagnosis seeme< at first no different fro m most othe new diagnostic methods. Now w• see that we are faced with pro b lems of assigning values to individ ua ls a nd designing programs d1 rected agai nst them. so For all these reasons, I su l 1it that the current practice of pren .al diagnosis and selective abor n threatens basic huma n rights nd I urge practitioners to recons ler the implementation of wide-s ale programs of diagnosis and abor1 >n. Prenatal diagnosis is indeed a ~ry exciting new technology with n my potentially beneficial uses in roviding "therapy" for the aff\ t ted fetus and help to anxious par . 1ts. These justifiable uses should not be overshadowed by allowi n it to become strictly an exercis in selective abortion .
Violate Equality Even more tha n abortion 0 1 demand, it seems to me, selc tive abortion e mbodies principle of unequal treatment which vi Jlate the fundamental moral and ega! equality of all human being . In the long run, this violation of fundamental rights · of equal treatment is a more serious threat to the '\ :tuality of life" of all of us than the birth of numerous children with defects will ever be. I am hearte ned by the seriousness with which Li nacre QuarterlY this matter has been taken i'n general both by parents a nd by physicians; nonetheless, it is a dangerous move to aid parents by eliminating their· children. We must beware of the implications of moving to a "quality of life" ethic in which persons are judged according to their social utility and hence "some are more equal than others."
But perhaps it will be objected that in view of the rece nt Supreme Court decisions on abortion, physicians really have no choice : Does not the woman now have a right to an abortion, and if so, does the medical practtttoner have any choice but to offer prenatal di agnosis and selective a bortion?
Admittedly, the Supreme Court's decisions are ambiguous. The Court declares that the " right of privacy" established in the Constitution is "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."Bt At the same time, however, the Court also maintains that " the abortion decision" is "inherently, and primarily, a medical decision," and at all points it appears to give the decision-making power to the physician: " The abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician. " 82 Thus it is not clear that physicians must comply with the demands of the woman ; there appears to be room for " medical judgment" in all cases, and especially in cases involving late abortion. Minimally, physicians can choose to make a true "medical judgment" regarding the woman's "life and health" in May, 1973 each case, and not simply to allow the very presence of defect to be considered su fficient justificatio n for abortion without further consideration of the "full setting of the case."83 Finally, it seems to me that all of us, physicians and lay persons alike, have a responsibility to women and families to provide the emotional and fina ncial support needed to enable families to care for children born with defects; although I discourage widescale prena tal diagnosis and selective abortion because of the serious threats to basic freedoms involved in this practice, I do not think the matter is settled morally by rejecting abortion. The birth of a child with a defect can indeed be a shattering experience for a family; it is the responsibility of all of us to ensure that families are provided with adequate resources. Ironically, as I write this, federal funds for many supportive programs are being curtailed ; this we must not allow to ha ppen.
If indeed the strength of a people can be measured by their attitude toward the weak, the defenseless, and the outcast, the n selective abortion points to the weaknesses in our society and in ourselves. It seems appropriate, therefore, to close with a word of warning offered by Ralph Potter:
When a fetus is aborted no one asks for who m the bell tolls. No bell is tolled. But do not feel indifferent a nd secure. The fetus symbolizes you and me and o ur tenuous hold upon a future here at the mercy of our fellow men. 84 (References available on request.)
